Undergraduate Mathematics Seminar
Social welfare functions and voting theory, by Meghan VanderMale (Ohio University, Mathematics)
What 


When 
Apr 03, 2013 from 04:10 PM to 05:00 PM 
Where  226 Morton Hall 
Contact Name  Martin Mohlenkamp 
Add event to calendar 
vCal iCal 
Abstract: Most of us are familiar with the “majority rules” voting system, but there are many other ways of converting votes into an outcome. In fact, there are certain “fair” voting systems which, when applied to a 3 candidate election, could result in the candidate whom the most number of people prefer to win coming in last place. We will discuss some of these voting systems in the context of social welfare functions and consider certain desirable properties (such as transitivity and nondictatorship) of these functions. We will also touch on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.